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Fifteen years ago the Committee on Com-
parative Politics, in the course of its grand de-
sign for the cross-national study of politics 
along the lines outlined in Gabriel Almond's 
classic introductory essay in The Politics of the 
Developing Areas, commissioned a series of in-
vestigations of "Interest Groups and the Politi-
cal Process." I was one of the Committee's 
grantees. 
One of our main tasks was to perform cen-
suses of interest groups and to describe their 
work. On the whole the results were disappoint-
ing. The conclusion of most of those who ex-
amined developing polities was that "interest 
groups" do not play as important a part in the 
political process as had been expected. This 
conclusion is reflected in the fact that the 
Princeton series of Studies in Political Develop-
ment, the major compilation of the product of 
the Committee and its grantees, includes as yet 
no volume on "Interest Groups and Political 
Development." And it seems unlikely that 
such a volume will appear in the near future. 
But if Almond's list of conversion functions 
remains sound, and I think it does, then "inter-
est articulation" must take place in any political 
system in which political decision making is a 
specialized task, and there must be structures to 
perform it. Almond and Powell, in their 1966 
work, ammended the theory to take account of 
the disappointing performance of the four 
types of groups listed in Almond's 1960 essay, 
i.e., institutional, non-associational, anomic, and 
associational interest groups, by drawing atten-
tion to the importance of individuals as "articu-
lators of their own interests."1 But they added 
that individual self-representation is "com-
monly cast in the guise of the articulation of 
more general societal or group interests." This 
missed a crucial point: That in many develop-
1 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., 
Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 75. For Al-
mond's earlier formulation, see The Politics of the De-
veloping Areas, ed. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. 
Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 
pp. 3-64. For the paper which guided the research of 
the Committee's grantees, see Gabriel A. Almond, "A 
Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political 
Process," American Political Science Review, 52 
(March, 1958), 270-82. 
ing polities the great bulk of individual self-rep-
resentation is self-representation pure and sim-
ple, without any pretense of a concern for the 
categorical interests of any collectivity, be it so-
ciety as a whole or a subgroup within it. The 
purpose of this paper is to explore the struc-
tural basis and the consequences of pure and 
impure self-representation in several Southeast 
Asian political systems, and to suggest some 
propositions and models which, it is hoped, will 
explain some of their peculiar features. 
At the outset, it may be useful to review the 
essentials of the "group theory" of politics, as 
well as some criticism of that theory. Stated in 
its broadest terms, the theory assumes that indi-
viduals act in politics largely as members of 
groups. A group is a set of individuals who 
share an attitude. They act together because 
they perceive that by doing so they are most 
likely to attain objectives consistent with the at-
titude which they share, and thus to gain simi-
lar individual rewards. Groups often, though 
not invariably, consist of persons whose_com-
mon attitude stems from the fact that they have 
some similar "background" characteristic such 
as sex, age, religion, occupation or social class. 
For this reason, much theorizing and research 
by political scientists in modern Western coun-
tries has focused on the assumed interrelation-
ship among the socioeconomic background at-
tributes of political actors, their political atti-
tudes, and their political behavior. 
The American version of the group theory 
comes to us from Arthur Bentley by way of 
David Truman and Earl Latham.2 Marxist the-
ory makes a similar assumption, that men who 
have something in common, in this case social 
class, will and should act in unison in their col-
lective interest. The now largely forgotten theo-
rists of the fascist corporate state also main-
tained that individuals who are alike do and 
should act in unison, though in their view the 
various "corporations" composed in each case 
of a functionally specialized sector of the econ-
omy should not clash but, like the organs of a 
2 Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); David B. 
Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: 
Knopf, 1951); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Poli-
tics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). 
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living organism, work in harmony for the 
higher purposes of the corporate state.3 
In all versions of the theory, individuals who 
become aware of their similar attitudes and/or 
background are assumed to find it to their ad-
vantage to create formal organizations of some 
sort, the better to advance their shared goals or 
interests, or to perform their organic functions. 
But formal organization is not essential to the 
theory in its broadest form. The essential fea-
ture is that individuals who are alike in some 
respect are more likely to act together than in-
dividuals who are not. 
As a prescription for self-interested action, 
the group theory has grave shortcomings. Man-
cur Olson, an economist, has pointed out that if 
the purpose of group action is merely to 
achieve categorical goals through which all 
members of a category will derive benefits, an 
individual member has no great incentive to 
contribute to the common effort. For even if he 
does not, he can expect to share in the fruits of 
that effort simply by being a member of that 
category.4 The theory has another serious 
weakness: It assumes that governmental action 
must take a categorical form: that government, 
or at least modern government, proceeds ac-
cording to the rule of law, that is, that laws will 
be enforced rigidly and impersonally whatever 
their content, and that individuals can benefit 
only through the operation of laws which pro-
vide similar benefits for all others similar to 
themselves. Only if this is assumed—and in 
many developing countries it is a highly dubi-
ous assumption—need individuals resort to the 
cumbersome method of advancing their private 
interests by working for the similar interests of 
countless others. These criticisms of the group 
theory lead to some alternative conceptualiza-
tions of political structure, including interest ar-
ticulation structure: those of the dyad and the 
dyadically structured system.5 
3 See Giovanni Gentile, "The Philosophical Basis of 
Fascism," and Alfredo Rocco, "The Political Doctrine 
of Fascism," in Readings on Fascism and National 
Socialism, Department of Philosophy, University of 
Chicago (Denver: Allan Swallow, n.d.). For a discus-
sion of the corporate state in practice, see Michael T. 
Florinsky, Fascism and National Socialism: A Study of 
Economic and Social Policies of the Totalitarian State 
(New York: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 86-100. 
4 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
5 A more rudimentary version of the dyadic model, 
developed here, may be found in Carl H. LandS, Lead-
ers, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine 
Politics, Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Se-
ries, No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast 
Asia Studies, 1965), Appendix II, "Group Politics and 
Dyadic Politics: Notes for a Theory." An earlier state-
The Nature of Dyads 
A standard anthropological dictionary de-
fines a "dyadic group" as "a pair of human be-
ings in a social relationship."6 This simple defi-
nition fits almost any two-person group. For 
the purposes of this discussion, however, some 
distinctions between different types of dyads 
are needed. 
First, it is useful to distinguish between cor-
porate dyads and exchange dyads. The former 
consist of two persons who, in matters that in-
terest the analyst, behave as one. The latter 
consist of two persons who maintain their sepa-
rate identities, but are engaged in relationships 
of exchange. Typically in exchange dyads the 
two members give or lend property to each 
other. But its ownership at any point in time, is 
individual, not joint. 
Exchange dyads in turn can be subdivided 
into supportive and antagonistic ones. In the 
former, the two members trade things of value. 
In the latter they trade injuries. 
In actual dyadic relationships, of course, 
these analytically distinct forms can be mixed. 
The relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, for example, now involves 
both supportive and antagonistic exchanges. 
And a marriage involves both the pooling and 
the exchange of resources. 
For political scientists, exchange dyads, espe-
cially supportive ones, are of primary interest. 
In the remainder of this paper, when I use the 
term "dyad" I shall mean supportive exchange 
dyads unless another type is specified. Some 
characteristics of dyads, other than those men-
tioned above, follow: 
Dyads may bind together persons who are 
alike or unalike. The ease with which dyads cut 
across occupational and class lines makes them 
of particular importance to political scientists 
ment is found in "Politics in the Philippines," Diss. 
Harvard University, 1958. The relationship between 
dyadic political structure and cognatic kinship is dis-
cussed at greater length in a paper, "Kinship and Poli-
tics in Pre-Modern and Non-Western Societies," which 
was submitted to the American Political Science Review 
in 1961. While not published at the time, it now ap-
pears in Southeast Asia: The Politics of National Inte-
gration, ed. John T. McAlister, Jr. (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1973), pp. 219-233. These writings owe a 
heavy debt to the late Robert N. Pehrson, whose classic 
study, The Bilateral Network of Social Relationships in 
Kdnkdmd Lapp District, Indiana University Publica-
tions, Slavic and East European Series, Vol. 5 (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Research Center in Anthro-
pology, Folklore, and Linguistics. 1957) introduced 
me to the peculiarities of dyadic structure. 
6 Charles Winick. Dictionary of Anthropology (New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 242. 
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interested in the processes of national integra-
tion and conflict resolution. 
Benefits obtained through dyadic exchanges 
tend to be particular rather than categorical. 
Each partner must reward the other, but need 
not support the goals of the whole category to 
which the other belongs. 
Dyadic exchanges tend to involve some de-
gree of reciprocity, but need not achieve exact 
reciprocity. Reciprocity is most likely to be ap-
proximated when the relationship is voluntary 
for both partners, when both must compete 
freely with other suppliers of the same rewards, 
when both control resources of roughly equal 
value, and when the relationship involves a 
minimum of antagonism. The achievement of 
exact reciprocity at any point in time, however, 
facilitates the termination of the dyad, and thus 
may be avoided. 
Dyads usually are linked to other dyads in 
larger structures, or are capable of being so 
linked. All the dyadic ties within a society or 
subsociety constitute its dyadic network. 
Each member of a dyadically structured sys-
tem has a personal combination of dyadic part-
ners which is uniquely his own. The personal 
alliance systems of different individuals may 
overlap and intersect, but are rarely identical. 
An individual's personal set of dyadic relation-
ships constitute his dyadic web. As in a spider 
web, the structurally most important strands 
are those which extend outward from the cen-
tral individual by whom or in whose behalf var-
ious of his allies, plus some of their allies, are 
brought into action. As in a spider web, the 
concentric circles of connecting links are of less 
importance. They represent the cooperation 
among the central individual's allies that takes 
place in their common effort to assist him. In-
sofar as a system is structured dyadically, i.e., as 
a network, organized action involving many 
persons tends to begin with the effort of one 
individual to mobilize members of his web, and 
then of their webs, in support of what he re-
gards as desirable goals. 
Personal webs, like individual dyads, can be 
subdivided analytically into vertically and hori-
zontally structured ones. Vertical webs are 
those whose central individual has greater sta-
tus, resources or power than his various dyadic 
partners have. As a general designation for 
most vertical webs of a political nature, I sug-
gest the term "personal following." A specific 
subtype of this general type are patron-client 
systems. The distinguishing feature of arche-
typal patron-client relationships is a broad but 
imprecise spectrum of mutual obligations con-
sistent with the belief that the patron should 
display an almost parental concern for and re-
sponsiveness to the needs of his client, and that 
the latter should display almost filial loyalty to 
his patron—beliefs reflected by the tendency for 
familial appellations to be employed in the re-
lationship. The operation of patron-client sys-
tems in politics has been the subject of three 
recent articles in the American Political Science 
Review. They are characteristic of traditional 
societies, and appear to be on the decline. Other 
types of personal followings, however, are likely 
to be with us for some time to come. 
Horizontal webs are those whose central in-
dividual has status, resources or power roughly 
equal to those of his various partners. For 
these, when they are political, the term "per-
sonal alliance system" seems appropriate. An 
example is an individual congressman's log-roll-
ing arrangements with various of his fellows. 
All the log-rolling arrangements in Congress 
constitute a network. 
The various dyadic ties within an individual's 
web may differ in the quality and quantity of 
their exchanges. Where this is the case, graded 
favoritism in the treatment of different partners 
usually is made explicit. 
The dyadic webs of individuals may differ in 
size. The number of one's alliances tends to be 
limited by one's material resources, and to be 
positively related to one's status and power. 
Dyadic structures tend to be most important, 
or most noticeable, where discrete structures 
are in short supply. That is to say, in systems 
which are small and premodern. Anthropolo-
gists therefore have been interested in them for 
some time. But political scientists, whose mod-
els are mainly of modern Western derivation, 
until recently have given them little attention.7 
7 There is a growing body of literature dealing with 
dyadic structures and in particular with patron-client 
relationships. Some seminal studies which are not men-
tioned elsewhere in this paper include the following: 
For Southeast Asia: James C. Scott, "Patron-Client 
Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 66 (March, 1972), 81-113. 
For South Asia see Frederik Barth, Political Leadership 
among Swat Pathans, London School of Economics 
Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 19 (London: 
The Athlone Press, 1965), pp. 71-126. For Northern 
Europe see Otto Blehr, "Action Groups in a Society 
with Bilateral Kinship: A Case Study of the Faroe Is-
lands," Ethnology, 3 (July, 1963), 269-275. For the 
Mediterranean area see Jeremy Boissevain, "Factions, 
Parties and Politics in a Maltese Village," American 
Anthropologist, 66 (December, 1964), 1275-1287; and 
by the same author, "Patronage in Sicily," Man, New 
Series 1 (March, 1966), 18-33. For Latin America see 
George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract: A Model 
for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village," 
American Anthropologist 63 (December, 1961), 1142-
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With a view to exploring various forms 
which dyadic structure can take and various 
tasks which they can perform, I shall describe 
certain elements of four Southeast Asian politi-
cal systems, each at a different point along a 
rough scale of modernization, and each im-
bedded in a different religious tradition. These 
systems are: the pagan Kalinga of Northern 
Luzon in the Philippines; the Tausug, a Muslim 
society in the Southern Philippines; the Thera-
•vada Buddhist monarchy of Thailand during 
the Ayudhya and Bangkok periods; and the 
predominantly Catholic Republic of the Philip-
pines. 
The Kalinga 
The first and most "primitive" example of a 
Southeast Asian polity is that of the Kalinga, 
one among several pagan peoples who inhabit 
the mountain region of Northern Luzon. Dur-
ing the period of American colonial rule, the 
Kalinga, or at least those of them who live near 
the several roads which have been built through 
the mountains by the colonial administration, 
have come increasingly under the influence of 
the outside world. But many of their traditional 
institutions survive, or survived long enough to 
be observed by anthropologists. 
The following description of Kalinga politi-
cal structure is based on studies by Roy Frank-
lin Barton and Edward P. Dozier.8 From them 
one learns that like many primitive societies, 
Kalinga society until recently was organized al-
most wholly on the basis of kinship ties. Ka-
1173; and by the same author "The Dyadic Contract in 
Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron-Client Relationship," Ameri-
can Anthropologist 65 (December, 1963), 1280-1294. 
For Africa see C. W. Gutkind, "Network Analysis and 
Urbanism in Africa: The Use of Micro and Macro 
Analysis," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthro-
pology, 2 (May, 1965), 123-131. For theoretical works 
which are not limited to specific countries or regions see 
John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, The Social 
Psychology of Groups (New York: Wiley, 1959), es-
pecially Part I, "Dyadic Relationships," pp. 9-187; John 
A. Barnes, "Networks and Political Process," in Social 
Networks in Urban Situations, ed. J. Clyde Mitchell 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969); John 
Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientist Poli-
tics," American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 
1970), 411^425; Rene Lemarchand, and Keith Legg, 
"Political Clientelism and Development," Comparative 
Politics, 4 (January, 1972), 149-178; and Norman E. 
Whitten, Jr. and Alvin W. Wolfe, "Network Analysis," 
prepared for Chap. 3, The Handbook of Social and 
Cultural Anthropology, ed. John J. Honigmann (Chi-
cago: Rand-McNally, in press) which includes an ex-
tensive bibliography. 
8 Roy Franklin Barton, The Kalingas: Their Institu-
tions and Custom Law (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1949); and Edward P. Dozier, Mountain 
Arbiters: The Changing Life of a Philippine Hill Peo-
ple (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966). 
linga kinship structure, like that of the other 
Southeast Asian societies described here, as 
well as of those of Northern Europe, is a type 
which anthropologists call "cognatic" or "bilat-
eral." 
The interesting characteristic of cognatic kin-
ship, from the point of view of this paper, is 
that outside the bounds of the immediate or 
"conjugal" family, its structure is essentially 
dyadic. In cognatic systems each individual, 
when he looks beyond his conjugal family, 
finds himself surrounded by a circle of rela-
tives, a collection of individuals whom anthro-
pologists call the "personal kindred." It is made 
up of the descendants of all his ancestors of 
a certain earlier generation without regard to 
sex or the side of his family tree. In Kalinga, 
the personal kindred consists for each individ-
ual, of all descendants of his eight pairs of 
great-grandparents. 
The main features of cognatic kindreds in 
Kalinga and elsewhere are as follows: 
Kindreds are individual-centered. That is to 
say, each individual's kindred is defined with 
reference to himself, and exists primarily to 
serve his needs. After his death, it disappears as 
a distinctive entity. 
Kindreds lack discrete external boundaries. 
Like the ripples from a stone dropped into a 
pool, the strength of kinship ties gradually de-
clines as the genealogical and affective distance 
of kinsmen from ego increases. 
The size and precise membership of each 
kindred depends largely upon the person at its 
core. It does so because he alone can decide 
how wide a circle of kinsmen he will attempt to 
cultivate, and which specific kinsmen he wishes 
to include among the functioning (as distin-
guished from purely nominal) members of his 
kindred. It does not depend exclusively upon 
his wishes, however, for each of those kinsmen 
with whom he wishes to maintain active ties 
must in turn be willing to maintain ties with 
him, i.e., must wish to count him as a member 
of his own personal kindred. 
No two individuals other than siblings have 
identical kindreds. The kindreds of close rela-
tives other than siblings overlap, but do not co-
incide. Further, as the kinsmen with whom an 
individual maintains effective ties depend in 
large part upon his choice, the effective kin-
dreds of even siblings are not necessarily identi-
cal. 
Thus a person's kindred is an outwardly ra-
diating collection of dyads with one individual 
at its core. A community so structured—and 
this is the case with Kalinga communities— 
may be conceived of as a dyadic network of 
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what George Peter Murdock describes as "in-
terlacing and overlapping" kinship ties.9 
Kalinga political culture is of a sort appro-
priate to an essentially anarchic society charac-
terized by endemic feuding. Fighting skill and 
bellicosity are highly valued among men, being 
essential to survival. Contentiousness in litiga-
tion, a major preoccupation of the Kalinga, 
provides less dangerous opportunities for the 
display of truculence. Egocentrism and family 
centrism are characteristic of the society, being 
modified only by the personal loyalty to more 
distant kinsmen that is necessary for personal 
survival in a dangerous environment. Similar 
cultural traits will be noted in connection with 
some of the other Southeast Asian societies. Be-
cause there were in the Kalinga region until 
American times no "public" functionaries 
charged with the punishment of murderers or 
other offenders, the most important function of 
the kindred was, and to a large degree still is, to 
support the individual in conflicts over prop-
erty or personal affronts which might lead to 
killing, or in case of actual killing to take ven-
geance through counter-killing against the killer 
or one of his kinsmen.10 
While rallying to his support or avenging his 
death, the personal kindred of an individual, is 
in a sense, a "group." But it is an ephemeral 
group, and the willingness of an individual 
kinsman to participate depends largely upon 
the way he has been treated in the past by the 
individual at the kindred's core. In short it de-
pends upon dyadic reciprocity. 
It may be asked whether traditional Kalinga 
society contains any discrete groups of a corpo-
rate type. There are a few. One such group, 
found among the Kalinga as among other peo-
ples, is the conjugal family consisting of a set 
of parents and their unmarried children. But 
the family is a temporary group, which disap-
pears with the death of the parents and is re-
placed by the separate newly formed conjugal 
families of the children. Furthermore, the Ka-
linga family begins as a rather uncertain alli-
ance, subject to fission under the stress of rival 
claims for loyalty from the parental families of 
each marital partner. Only with the birth of the 
"George Peter Murdock, Social Structure (New 
York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 60. For an excellent dis-
cussion of the nature of groups resulting from cognatic 
descent, see Robin Fox, Chap. 6, "Cognatic Descent 
and Ego-centered Groups," Kinship and Marriage (Bal-
timore: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 146-174. 
10 The personal kindred performed very similar tasks 
in early Europe. For an exploration of this subject see 
Bertha Surtees Phillpotts, Kindred and Clan in the 
Middle Ages and After: A Study in the Sociology of 
the Teutonic Races (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1913). 
first child—i.e., with the appearance of an indi-
vidual related by blood to both parental kin-
dreds, does the marriage become a really stable 
one. 
Among some neighboring and otherwise sim-
ilar tribes, the people of Sagada and the Ifugao, 
there are to be found in addition to conjugal 
families and personal kindreds some cognatic 
descent groups. These consist of all the descen-
dants, through both males and female links, of 
some prominent founding ancestor.11 Such 
groups, sometimes called "conical clans," are 
discrete. Their usefulness for the organization 
of society is limited, however, by the fact that, 
unlike unilineal descent groups, they overlap so 
that an individual, through different ancestral 
lines, may be a member of many such groups. 
In Sagada, conical clans since the introduction 
of electoral politics in American times, form 
the bases of political factions. In addition there 
are in Sagada clearly demarcated "wards" 
within which councils of old men settle disputes 
and organize rituals. But neither of these types 
of discrete structure are present to a significant 
degree in Kalinga. They are mentioned here be-
cause they remind one of the advantages which 
lie in discrete groups, and show how discrete 
groups can be created in simple cognatic soci-
eties. 
The nature of the terrain inhabited by the 
Kalinga divides them geographically into a num-
ber of distinct settlements. These however had 
little that could be called local government 
prior to that which is now imposed by the low-
land state. Nowhere in Kalinga, even in very 
small settlements where all regarded each other 
as kinsmen, was there a single identifiable 
"headman." Nowhere was there a body whose 
members separately or collectively had author-
ity over all inhabitants of the settlement. What 
existed was not authority but personal leader-
ship. There were and are in every Kalinga set-
tlement some individuals whose exceptional 
prowess in combat or whose superior wealth or 
wisdom gave them influence not only over their 
immediate family members but over many of 
their more distant kinsmen as well. When one 
of these self-made leaders decided upon some 
course of action, a cluster of persons made up 
" Fred Eggan, "The Sagada Igorots of Northern Lu-
zon," in Social Structure in Southeast Asia, ed. George 
Peter Murdock (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), 
pp. 27-30. Similar groups are found among the Muslim 
Maranao of the Southern Philippines, but not among 
the Christian peoples of the islands. See Melvin Med-
nick, Encampment of the Lake: The Social Organiza-
tion of a Moslem-Philippine (Moro) People, Philippine 
Studies Program, Department of Anthropology, Univer-
sity of Chicago, Research Series, No. 5 (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Philippine Studies Program, 1965). 
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of his family and of these more distant kins-
men-followers were likely to support him. And 
when all of the leaders of substantial personal 
followings could agree on some course of ac-
tion—a rare occurrence in any case—a large 
proportion of the settlement could be mobi-
lized into action—but not the entire settlement. 
For while not everyone could be a leader, no 
one was obliged to be a follower. There was al-
ways the option of being an independent indi-
vidual who neither led nor followed any man, 
and it was the presence of such individuals, as 
well as frequent disagreement among leaders, 
that made communitywide action extremely 
hard to achieve. 
Further, community action was of an ex-
tremely limited sort, being concerned mainly 
with such matters as defense against raiding 
parties from other settlements. It fell far short 
of "government." There was no law making, no 
tax collection, no arresting of accused persons 
by policemen, no courts, and no public execu-
tioner. Killing and other wrongs were torts 
against individuals and their kindreds, not 
crimes against the community, and they were 
dealt with by individuals with the assistance of 
their kinsmen, and the help of neutral media-
tors. Under such conditions justice varied, de-
pending upon the relative ferocity of the two 
antagonists and the size of the kindred which 
each could mobilize in his support. 
While the Kalinga lacked territorial author-
ity, even at the local level, they at least recog-
nized the existence of discrete geographic 
boundaries between neighboring settlements. 
Not so the Ifugao, another pagan tribe living 
nearby. Among the Ifugao, Barton reports, geo-
graphic boundaries were vague and shifting. 
Each "region" or settlement was viewed by its 
inhabitants as the center of a series of concen-
tric rings which Barton calls respectively the 
"home region," the "feudist zone," and the 
"war zone," terms which suggest the decreasing 
restraints upon violence toward people who live 
at increasing distances from one's home. The 
Ifugao had no common conception of a larger 
territory subdivided into districts or similar 
units. Zones structured territory as the kindred 
structured people: in terms of distance from 
ego or ego's place of residence. Barton, citing 
Henry Sumner Maine, assumed the absence of 
discrete territorial boundaries to be a fairly 
primitive trait. But as will be noted in several 
of the later cases, a dearth of discrete bounda-
ries or of organization based upon such bound-
aries, is characteristic of some more advanced 
polities as well and seems to be consistent with 
their preference for dyadic structures. 
Because the Kalinga, in contrast to the Ifu-
gao, recognized discrete territorial boundaries, 
they were able to create an interregional net-
work of "peace pacts" which, though essen-
tially dyadic, had some relationship to territory. 
Until recent times the absence of roads, the vir-
tual restriction of marriage to members of the 
same locality, and the danger of being killed if 
one ventured far from one's home region 
served as a strong deterrent to interregional 
travel. With the construction of roads through 
the mountains by the lowland colonial govern-
ment during the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, travel between regions became easier 
while the possibility of profit making through 
interregional trade provided incentives for such 
travel. To assure their safety when visiting each 
others' regions, pairs of native traders estab-
lished trading partnerships through which each 
partner gave food and lodging to the other and, 
more important, promised to avenge him as he 
would avenge his own kinsmen should the 
other be killed by someone in that region. Dur-
ing the latter part of the nineteenth century, this 
institution which initially had given protection 
only to the two partners, became transformed 
into a more elaborate system under which two 
"pact holders" living in different regions under-
took each in his own region to avenge any trav-
eler from the other's region who met violence 
while visiting there. Individual protection thus 
became blanket protection, but was still an-
chored in individuals. It was the pact holder as-
sisted by his personal kindred, and not the re-
gion, which offered protection. It was the pact 
holder who paid compensation if he failed to 
avenge, and who collected compensation if the 
other pact holder failed to do so. And if a pact 
holder died, and no one else came forth to take 
his place, the pact lapsed and with it the possi-
bility of safe travel between the two regions. 
Furthermore, each two of the many regions of 
Kalinga had—or did not have—their separate 
pacts with each other, and for each pact affect-
ing a region the pact-holder might be a differ-
ent individual. The complex of pacts thus was 
a network, not an association. Finally, when-
ever a new pact was negotiated, any individual 
in either pact holder's region who had an unset-
tled blood-debt to avenge in the other region 
could assert the right to be excluded from the 
coverage of the pact. 
Thus the Kalinga were never able to devise 
what to foreigners might seem a much more 
logical, effective, and categorical solution to the 
problem of individual security: the establish-
I 
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ment of a Kalinga-wide confederation guaran-
teeing everyone protection everywhere. The 
system was as primitive, and as dyadic in struc-
ture, as was the international community of 
powers prior to the establishment of the League 
of Nations. 
The Tausug 
The second Southeast Asian political system 
is that of the Tausug, a Moslem ethno-lin-
guistic group of some 325,000 persons who live 
in the Sulu island chain which links the main 
Southern Philippine island of Mindanao with 
Northern Borneo. Roughly half of the Tausug 
reside on the largest of the Sulu islands, Jolo. 
The Tausug have a cognatic kinship system 
with a slight patrilineal bias which is attribut-
able to the influence of Islam. Most of them 
live in scattered upland settlements where they 
engage in intensive dry rice farming. The de-
scription and explanation of Tausug political 
institutions presented here is taken entirely 
from the studies of Thomas M. Kiefer, an an-
thropologist.12 
Unlike the rest of the territory of the present 
Republic, the Southern extremities of the Phil-
ippine archipelago, including Sulu, never came 
under the effective rule of the Spanish colonial 
regime. Foreign military subjugation of its 
"Moro" inhabitants was accomplished only dur-
ing the American colonial period. Even now 
the authority of the national government in this 
region is uncertain. The Tausug continue to 
deal with their own affairs, and in particular to 
settle their own disputes, largely through tradi-
tional political institutions. Thus the Tausug, 
though nominally Filipinos, retain a political 
culture and a largely autonomous political sys-
tem which are premodern in nature and which 
have more in common with the culture and 
polity of traditional Moslem Indonesia and 
Eastern Malaysia than with those of the long 
Christianized majority of the Philippines. 
Except for some now moribund functions of 
the sultan, Kiefer's description is of Tausug po-
litical institutions as they function today. These 
institutions are of interest here because, as 
Kiefer observes: 
12 Thomas M. Kiefer, "Institutionalized Friendship 
and Warfare among the Tausug of Jolo," Ethnology 7 
(July, 1968), 225-244; and Tausug Armed Conflict: 
The Social Organization of Military Activity in a Philip-
pine Moslem Society, Philippine Studies Program, De-
partment of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Re-
search Series, No. 7 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Philippine Studies Program, 1969); The Tausug: Vio-
lence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). 
Corporate groups on all planes of society except the 
ultimate level of the sultan, are distinctly secondary 
to dyadic social relationships.13 
and: 
The Tausug seem to have taken the pervasive Philip-
pine indigenous institution of dyadic ritualized 
friendship and used it as a major foundation for the 
establishment of a state based on Islamic models, 
without having developed the geographically de-
fined units of . . . more politically centralized 
societies." 
In contrast to the Kalinga, the Tausug, prior 
to the imposition of American colonial rule 
during the second decade of this century suc-
ceeded in creating an incipient state. They 
shared a conception of a supralocal community 
with a common body of law and a collection of 
offices differing in their dignity and the spatial 
extent of their authority. These offices reached 
their apex in the office of the sultan. 
This community, its law, and its offices sur-
vive today. The sultan in recent years has lost 
many of his old duties. Not so the local head-
men-leaders who are the main subjects of Kief-
er's study, and are of special interest from the 
point of view of the dyadic model. These func-
tionaries continue to play a number of impor-
tant roles—the nature of which can be ex-
plained in part by certain features of Tausug 
culture. 
Like the political culture of the Kalinga-, that 
of the Tausug places a high value upon the per-
sonal defense of honor and property. This en-
courages a high incidence of both violence and 
litigation. Vengeance killing in the pursuit of 
private feuds is endemic. The obvious parallels 
with Kalinga feuding suggest that this is a pre-
Islamic element of Tausug political culture. At 
the same time, Kiefer notes, the Tausug seek 
order and a sense of community through their 
common acceptance of a Tausug version of Is-
lamic law. 
Out of these contrasting values arises a need 
for figures of superordination who are adept 
both at peacekeeping through the enforcement 
of the law, and at the type of violent action de-
manded by feuding. Both tasks are performed 
by men whom Kiefer describes variously as 
headmen or as leaders. 
That part of Tausug ideology which the Tau-
sug themselves believe to be Islamic in deriva-
tion requires that every Tausug be subject to 
the law. More precisely, it requires that he be 
subject to an individual capable of acting as 
"Kiefer, Tausug Armed Conflict, p. 189. 
14 Kiefer, Tausug Armed Conflict, p. 192. 
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"the law," a person who has the authority to 
adjudicate, arbitrate or mediate, and the physi-
cal means to see to it that the outcomes of such 
legal actions are obeyed. The substance of this 
law is laid down in written form by each reign-
ing sultan. The authority to enforce it, i.e., to 
act as "the law" is also bestowed by the sultan 
through the awarding of one of a variety of 
ranked secular or religious titles, though this 
function of the sultan now is performed less 
frequently than formerly. 
But subjection of individuals to specific su-
perordinates qualified to act as "the law" in-
volves a substantial element of individual con-
sent. While some titles are claimed through in-
heritance, they are in practice awarded only to 
those who have been able to gain acceptance as 
leaders. Furthermore, a headman's authority 
when it has been given formal sanction by the 
sultan, remains confined to those who are will-
ing to be subject to it. This means that head-
manship is not, strictly speaking, territorial. Re-
ceipt of a title, Kiefer reports, "does not neces-
sarily guarantee to the holder any particular 
territory which is exclusively his own and dis-
tinct from that of any other office holder."15 It 
has more the character of a license to practice 
law than of judicial authority over a specified 
bailiwick. Yet it does have a limited spatial as-
pect: Usually in any local settlement there will 
be found but one title holder. In the general vi-
cinity of his domicile, his authority, legal and 
otherwise, is strong and nearly exclusive. The 
requirement that every Tausug be subject to 
some title holder qualified to act as the law, 
and the awesome proximity of a popular head-
man would seem to encourage acceptance. But 
with increasing distance from his place of resi-
dence, the proportion of individuals who de-
cline to accept his authority in legal matters or 
who divide their allegiance between him and 
the headman of a neighboring settlement in-
creases. Furthermore, his power to adjudicate 
declines with increasing distance, and only the 
ability to arbitrate or mediate remains. Finally, 
the range of his authority and influence may 
expand and contract during the course of his 
lifetime, and differ markedly from that of pre-
vious headmen who had the same place of resi-
dence.16 
When disputes arise between the subjects of 
different headmen, they usually can be arbi-
15 Kiefer, Tausug Armed Conflict, p. 36. 
16 Kiefer concludes, "Territoriality . . . is not gen-
erally conceived in terms of boundaries which create 
discrete spatial units, but rather in terms of the space 
which vaguely surrounds a single point." Kiefer, Tausug 
Armed Conflict, p. 31. 
trated by a higher title holder. But many dis-
putes, it appears, are not settled through such 
peaceful means. Often disputes lead to vio-
lence which may turn into large scale warfare. 
And then Tausug headmen, especially the 
younger among them, assume different and 
more partisan roles as leaders of small bands of 
men of fighting age whose function is to sup-
port their members in their private feuds with 
nonmembers. Indeed, it is leadership of such 
armed bands that gives them the raw power 
needed to qualify as agents of the law in the 
Tausug state.17 These armed followings in turn 
are but elements of larger fighting alliances 
which are made necessary by the Tausug dedi-
cation to feuding and to war. 
Kiefer examines this system of fighting alli-
ances in detail. In describing its structure he be-
gins with simple dyadic relationships of friend-
ship and of leadership and followership. For 
this purpose he employs a formal model of 
dyadic interaction based upon a model I had 
presented in an earlier publication.18 Alliances 
for mutual aid between leaders of personal 
followings in turn are used to create ad hoc 
combinations of increasing size, culminating in 
maximal alliances which may stretch across an 
area spanning the whole Sulu archipelago, and 
pit themselves against equally extensive oppos-
ing alliances. At all levels except that of the sul-
tanate itself, Kiefer finds "dyadism" to be the 
most striking structural feature of the~system. 
Indeed, dyadism manifests itself even in the 
heat of battle, where each combatant directs his 
fire with a due regard for the nature of his con-
nection with, and the degree of his enmity 
toward each member of the opposing side.10 
While using the same structural devices as 
the Kalingas, the Tausug in their alliances are 
able to mobilize much larger numbers of fight-
ing men for individual engagements. The rea-
son for this is clear. The Kalinga, in pursuing 
what remain purely private feuds, rely for sup-
port upon a relatively small number of actual 
kinsmen. The only exception to this rule is the 
peace pact, a recent invention which through 
the establishment of compacts between unre-
lated pact holders in different regions offers 
protection to individual travelers far from 
home. The Tausug have moved to a higher stage 
of both integration and conflict. Sharing a sense 
of membership in an incipient state, which 
brings with it a general interest and involve-
ment in the power struggles of great men, and 
being far more mobile than the mountain-
17 Kiefer, Tausug Armed Conflict, p. 37. 
18 Kande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties, pp. 141-148. 
"Kiefer, Tausug Armed Conflict, pp. 167-171. 
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bound Kalinga, the Tausug have created large 
alliances for the pursuit of civil and external 
war. For this, ties between kinsmen are not 
enough. Therefore, they have learned to make 
extensive use of interpersonal alliances of 
friendship and ritual kinship formalized 
through the common Muslim Filipino custom 
of swearing together on the Koran. 
To sum up, in a society where discrete de-
scent groups, voluntary associations, and terri-
torial units are lacking, relationships of super-
ordination and subordination are highly per-
sonal, and to a large degree voluntary. The 
span of a superordinate's authority has no clear 
cut boundaries either in terms of territory or 
population groups. Thus as in Kalinga, dyadic 
structure is superimposed upon both space and 
society. 
The Monarchy of Premodern Thailand 
The next example of a Southeast Asian politi-
cal system is that of a fully developed mon-
archy. The case employed for this purpose is 
the absolute monarchy of Thailand from the 
beginning of the reign of King Trailokanat 
(1448 AD) in the latter part of the Ayudhya 
period, until the accession of King Chulalong-
korn (1873) which marked the end of the 
early Bangkok period. This monarchy had a 
strong ruler, and performed a wide variety of 
administrative tasks. Nonetheless it relied heav-
ily upon dyadic structure in performing them. 
The institutions of the monarchy underwent 
many changes during the four centuries from 
which information is drawn. But the features to 
which I call attention retained their essential 
character throughout most of this time. My 
main sources are two historical reconstructions, 
one focusing upon the Ayudhya period and 
based largely on legal texts, by H. G Quaritch-
Wales, the second dealing with the early Bang-
kok period, and based on a broader spectrum 
of contemporary records by a Thai scholar, 
Akin Rabibhadana.20 
Like almost all of Southeast Asia prior to the 
twentieth century, premodern Thailand had a 
population much smaller than that which could 
be supported by the available land. This was es-
pecially the case because the population of 
Thailand, like most of lowland Southeast Asia, 
cultivated irrigated rice, a grain which produces 
a very high yield for a given amount of land. 
20 H. G. Quaritch-Wales, Ancient Siamese Govern-
ment and Administration (London: Bernard Quaritch, 
Ltd., 1934); and Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization 
of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-
1873, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Data 
Paper No. 74 (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast 
Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, 1969). 
The surplus of land meant that most of premod-
ern Southeast Asia, in the words of Georges 
Condominas, consisted of a scattering of culti-
vated islands of population set in an empty but 
potentially cultivable jungle. As a result, Rabi-
bhadana argues, manpower was more in de-
mand than land. This had important political 
consequences. One of these consequences was 
that in mainland Southeast Asia the main pur-
pose of warfare was the capture of populations 
with a view to settling them on uncultivated 
land in the environs of the conqueror's capital, 
rather than the acquisition of new terrain in 
distant places. This meant in turn that from a 
ruler's point of view the effective mobilization 
of his own subjects for attack and defense in 
time of war was essential to the survival of his 
realm, while the demarcation of precise jungle 
boundaries between his and the neighboring 
realm was of less importance.21 
This favorable ratio of men to land may 
have encouraged the growth of structural and 
normative patterns useful for the maintenance 
of control over people: Patron-client ties im-
posed by the state, obedience, deference, the re-
payment of favors on the part of those subject to 
the power of others, and the possession and con-
spicuous display of large personal retinues on 
the part of the powerful.22 
Students of Thai history are in some dis-
agreement as to the structure of the Thai politi-
cal system during the first century of the Ay-
udhya period and the Sukhothai period which 
preceded it. As early as the time of King Trail-
okanat, however, most of the realm was under 
direct royal administration through governors 
appointed by the king, though some outlying 
areas were in the early part of the period under 
the largely independent but nonhereditary con-
trol of certain princely kinsmen of the king. In 
the capital there were established a number of 
departments of government called krom. 
During the early portion of the period these 
krom with few exceptions were under the effec-
tive or titular headship of high ranking princes 
or princesses. Commoner officials staffed their 
lower levels, and during the Bangkok period of-
ten rose to krom headships. Nonetheless, the 
princes and princesses as a group maintained 
their positions of privilege well into the present 
21 Rabibhadana, p. 53. 
22 Rabibhadana notes, pp. 119-120, that the large vol-
ume of historical legal documents concerning disputes 
over the control of manpower contrasts sharply with 
the dearth of similar documents dealing with disputes 
over land. For a discussion of Thai retinues today, see 
Lucien M. Hanks, Jr., "The Corporation and the En-
tourage: A Comparison of Thai and American Social 
Organization," Catalyst (Summer, 1966), pp. 55-63. 
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century. Indeed resentment of these privileges 
by Western-educated commoner officials was 
one of the causes of the palace revolt of 1932 
which ushered in the present system of govern-
ment. 
The main administrative tasks of the premod-
ern Thai monarchy consisted in peacetime, of 
public works construction, and in wartime of 
the organization of large scale military activity. 
The labor involved in these efforts was pro-
vided by the mass of the king's subjects. It is 
the manner in which this labor was mobilized 
and directed that is of special interest here, for 
it was managed through an elaborate system of 
patron-client arrangements which endured with 
but minor modifications from the fourteenth to 
the nineteenth century. 
The earliest references to such a system are 
for the year 1356, when by a royal command 
everyone was required to register under a 
leader. Those who failed to do so were to be 
registered directly under the king.23 It was un-
der such leaders or patrons (nai) that service 
to the king was to be performed by those who 
were registered as their clients (phrai). The nai 
were thus in effect officials of the state, and this 
soon came to mean that for those who were not 
princes or princesses, and thus were not entitled 
to have clients as a matter of right, an appoint-
ment to an official post became a prerequisite— 
and a license—for the enlistment of clients. 
The system was actually a pyramidal one. 
Lesser officials who had clients of their own 
were in their turn the clients of higher officials, 
and all officials above a certain grade, whether 
they were princes or not, were the direct clients 
of the king to whom they pledged personal al-
legiance. 
Although this officially created patron-client 
tie entailed quite specific government-related 
duties, it appears to have included a broader, 
more diffuse set of mutual obligations as well. 
Aside from service to the state and the patron's 
legal responibility to deliver his client to the 
courts and defend him there if he was charged 
with a crime, it involved, as do patron-client re-
lationships in most premodern societies, a 
broad range of supervisory and protective re-
sponsibilities on the part of the patron who in 
turn could dispose of substantially more of his 
clients' time than that which they owed the 
state. 
Eventually the system became quite com-
plex. For those outside the ranks of the nai, 
three distinctive alternative forms of subordina-
tion were recognized by law. All of these in-
volved attachment to a specific superordinate. 
23 Rabibhadana, p. 20. 
Some clients were attached for their govern-
ment service directly to a princely or bureau-
cratic superior. Others were attached directly to 
the king. He in turn assigned them to perform 
their service under specific officials who thus 
had both direct and royal clients working under 
their direction. Finally, a substantial number of 
Thai, estimated by a nineteenth-century Euro-
pean observer to comprise one-fourth of the 
population, were bound to specific members of 
the princely and bureaucratic elite not as gov-
ernment service clients but as private debt 
bondsmen.24 
The subordination system described here is 
thus a classic example of vertical dyadic struc-
ture.25 As might be expected in a system so or-
ganized, conflict between the king and the 
lesser power-holders of his realm took the form 
of a struggle over the right to control and make 
use of manpower more than over the posses-
sion of land.26 In this struggle the nai, led by 
the great princes were for a time the stronger. 
As royal clients were wholly the king's men, 
their annual periods of corvee service were 
longer than those which could be demanded of 
direct clients of officials, a portion of whose 
time belonged to the latter for their private dis-
posal in lieu of what in modern times would 
have been their salaries, or of debt bondsmen 
who had the heaviest nonofficial demands on 
their time. As many commoners had at̂  least 
some choice in determining their own status, 
their patrons encouraged them to choose direct 
clientage or, ideally, debt bondage. The patrons 
did this by securing for their direct clients or 
24 Debt bondage, which varied in its degree of un-
freedom from merely nominal mortgaging of the debtor 
or a member of his family, through actual debt service, 
to hereditary slavery, was encouraged by the rule that a 
patron had a first right to extend loans to his govern-
ment clients. If a debtor defaulted in his repayments, 
he could be transformed from a government client into 
the patron's private debt bondsman, the degree of his 
unfreedom depending upon the extent of this indebted-
ness. 
2! Whether the obligation of clientage was confined 
to men, or applied to both men and women is unclear. 
Some comments by Wales suggest the latter. See his 
observation, p. 53 that "When the parents belonged to 
different kroms, or had different patrons in the same 
krom, their children, on reaching the age at which gov-
ernment service was required of them, were divided be-
tween the patrons of their parents." Other descriptions 
of Thai clientage make no reference to women. But 
women it appears, were sold into slavery. Almost all 
men, at least, of nonelite status were obliged to assume 
one of these roles of subordination, according to the ob-
servation of an early nineteenth-century foreign observer, 
mentioned by Rabibhadana, p. 81; this foreigner noted 
that free labor did not exist, for the labor of every indi-
vidual was appropriated by one or another chief, with-
out whose approval he could not work. 
M Rabibhadana, pp. 36-39, 56-59. 
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debt bondsmen increased (and sometimes 
total) exemption from government service, and 
by making private service less onerous than 
government service.27 This alienation of royal 
clients during the latter years of the Ayudhya 
period contributed, in the opinion of Rabibha-
dana, to the weakening and defeat of the state 
at the hands of the Burmese. Subsequent rulers 
at Bangkok reversed the trend and increased 
their control of manpower by lessening the bur-
dens of royal clients while decreasing the ex-
emptions from corvee service of private clients 
and debt bondsmen, and by requiring that all 
clients be tatooed with the names of their pa-
trons and their towns of residence.28 
One aspect of the traditional Thai system has 
special importance for an understanding of the 
functioning of dyadic structures and of the con-
ditions under which they can be expected to be 
prominent: A question on which Thai special-
ists have been in some disagreement is whether 
the krom of premodern Thailand were territo-
rial units, functionally specialized units, or a 
mixture of the two. The historical materials 
presented by H. G. Quaritch-Wales suggested 
to him and to others who have accepted his in-
terpretation, including Vella, Mosel, and Siffin, 
that an earlier "feudalistic" territorial form of 
organization was replaced in King Trailoka-
nat's time by a system of centrally directed 
krom that in the words of Mosel, "tended to 
have both territorial and functional responsibil-
ities, which in time led to considerable con-
founding and overlap."29 
27 Under Ayudhya law, as reported by Wales, p. 5, 
commoners were entitled to choose and leave their pa-
trons. That in practice this right was always preserved 
seems unlikely. A decree by King Rama II quoted by 
Rabibhadana, p. 88, which promised runaway clients 
that if they returned from the jungle "this time only 
they would not be punished and would be allowed to 
choose their new patrons," attests to this. On the other 
hand Rabibhadana reports, pp. 34-35, that it was fairly 
easy, prior to the institution of tatooing of clients, for a 
dissatisfied client to abscond and have himself secretly 
taken in by another patron, or find another patron who 
would buy him from his first master, or by lending him 
money convert him into his debt bondsman. 
28 Rabibhadana, pp. 38, 59. The alienation of royal 
clients by princely patrons and the consequent weaken-
ing of royal authority recalls a somewhat similar devel-
opment which took place in Japan during the several 
centuries which followed the first attempt to establish 
a centralized bureaucratic state in the seventh and 
eighth centuries. In the Japanese case however the de-
velopment involved the control of land and only sec-
ondarily the enlistment of manpower. See George San-
som, A History of Japan to 1334 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1958), pp. 83-89. 
29 James N. Mosel, "Thai Administrative Behavior," 
in Toward the Comparative Study of Public Adminis-
tration, ed. William J. Siffin, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indi-
ana University Press, 1957), p. 287. Rabibhadana, pp. 
Fred Riggs, drawing on Heine-Geldern, has 
attempted to account for this apparent struc-
tural confusion by suggesting that late Ayudhya 
krom were designed to be neither territorial nor 
functionally specialized entities but rather to be 
"cosmological and topological" units which 
would conform to the requirement, derived 
from Indian religious belief, that the realm, like 
the palace at its center, be arranged in accor-
dance with the directions of the compass. Terri-
torial or functional responsibilities or both were 
then assigned to these units, Riggs argues, as 
convenience dictated.30 Riggs's suggestion that 
krom were designed to be something other than 
territorial or functional units seems reasonable, 
but a cosmological explanation of this fact 
seems unconvincing as more than a partial ex-
planation. I find more persuasive the interpreta-
tion of Rabibhadana, which was foreshadowed 
by Hanks, that the krom were intended primar-
ily to be units of manpower.31 If this inter-
pretation is correct, then the aim of the mon-
arch in establishing the krom would appear 
to have been a dual one: to attain tight con-
trol over a maximum number of his subjects, 
and to make use of, but at the same time 
limit, the power of his princely kinsmen. 
Given the man-land ratio of premodern 
Thailand and the values and forms of orga-
nization which this encouraged, as well as 
the rule of declining princely descent, the 
most efficient method of achieving these ov-
erarching goals was to attach individuals to 
individuals in a great pyramid of centrally 
controlled nonhereditary patron-client arrange-
ments.32 The assignment to such units of desig-
nations which satisfied cosmological, functional, 
29, 31, notes that, legally, towns were equated with 
krom, and that governors were equated with chiefs of 
krom. 
30 Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a 
Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 
1966), pp. 70-72, 79; and Robert Heine-Geldern, Con-
ceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia, Cor-
nell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 
18 (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 
Department of Far Eastern Studies, 1956), pp. 3-5. 
31 Rabibhadana, p. 77. Hanks, who is quoted by Ra-
bibhadana has described the premodern social order of 
Thailand as one "which resembles a military organiza-
tion more than an occidental class type society." Lucien 
M. Hanks, Jr., "Merit and Power in the Thai Social 
Order," American Anthropologist, 64 (December, 
1962), pp. 1247-1261; cited at 1252. 
33 Under the rule of declining princely descent, a 
king's numerous male descendants by his many wives 
could pass on their rank to their descendants only in 
diminished form. The sixth generation became com-
moners. A king's female descendants could receive rank 
but could not transmit it even in diminished form. This 
would seem to have discouraged the creation of stable 
heritable princely clienteles. 
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or territorial needs would have been a matter of 
little difficulty. 
Some evidence that supports this interpreta-
tion, presented by Rabibhadana, includes his 
finding that new krom frequently were created 
to provide positions and clients for specific 
princes and princesses, and conversely that on 
the death of a prince his clients often were 
transformed into royal clients and the krom as 
a whole, consisting of both clients and lesser of-
ficials, converted into a sub-^rom and attached 
to another major krom.33 
But the contrary interpretation, that krom 
were more than transitory unspecialized aggre-
gations of manpower, is supported by the fact 
that various krom did have names indicative of 
specific functions. And further ambiguity is 
added because during some periods at least, 
when a high personage lost his krom, his direct 
clients remained with him and could be inher-
ited by his descendants, while his royal clients 
stayed with the krom.34 
It appears, then, that there is no single way 
of describing a krom in premodern Thailand. It 
seems to have been a catchall term used to de-
scribe various kinds of units including the per-
sonal retinue of a prince, a troop of soldiers un-
der an appointive nonprincely commander, 
and a rough territorial jurisdiction defined as 
much by its inhabitants as by precise geo-
graphic boundaries. In later years it came to 
mean a functionally specific department of the 
central government. But clearly even in quite 
recent times, many krom were designed at least 
in part to provide support groups and a living 
for the great men and women of the realm. 
The advantages of a system of administra-
tion employing movable entourages is obvious. 
The leader with his clients can be shifted about 
without being allowed to develop the strength 
that is to be derived from a fixed territorial 
base. Yet he is made a useful agent of the king 
by being given a body of men personally loyal 
to himself—an essential ingredient of effective 
administration in premodern societies. If he 
proves his loyalty to the king, he can be al-
lowed to increase the size of his following. If 
his loyalty is in doubt, his retinue can be de-
creased or taken from him, or he can be made 
subordinate to a more trusted leader, or sent off 
with his men to some distant place. This type 
of organization is possible, however, only in a 
state which can dispense with complex and sta-
ble territorial organization, and one in which 
the need for a high degree of functional spe-
cialization at the center has not yet developed. 
33 Rabibhadana, pp. 31, 78. 
"Rabibhadana, pp. 30-31. 
This, it appears, was the case in premodern 
Thailand. 
Patron-client relationships described here for 
the late Ayudhya and early Bangkok periods, 
continue to be among the main building blocks 
of the Thai society and polity today. David 
Wilson has given us the classic description of 
how great personal followings serve as the sup-
port groups of individual members of govern-
ing "coup groups" both in the Thai bureau-
cracy, military and civilian, and in Parliament. 
Fred Riggs has examined the same subject fur-
ther, and in addition has explored patron-client 
relationships between high Thai officials and 
Chinese pariah capitalists on the one hand, and 
between such officials and the organizers of 
various voluntary associations on the other. 
William Siffin has explored the same subject in 
the sphere of administration. Finally, various 
nonpolitical scientists, aside from Hanks and 
Rabibhadana, including James Mosel and Her-
bert Phillips, have noted the importance of per-
sonal alliances in nonpolitical spheres of con-
temporary Thai society.35 Their findings will 
not be summarized for Thailand is employed 
here as the example of a premodern monarchy. 
The Modern Philippines 
For analysis of a modern system which 
makes much use of dyadic structures and tech-
niques, a society with yet another religious tra-
dition may be examined: that of the predomi-
nantly Christian, Hispanized, and American-
ized Republic of the Philippines. 
The Philippine case is based upon my own 
past and ongoing research. A more detailed dis-
cussion of Philippine politics may be found 
elsewhere.36 The Philippine political system is 
set within a political culture which may be de-
scribed as follows: The individual sees himself 
in an unpredictable, competitive world in which 
his first concern must be with his own welfare 
and that of his immediate family. In the pursuit 
of self and family interest he finds himself in 
conflict with others. This leads to mistrust and 
envy. It also leads to the placing of a high value 
upon the achievement of power and domi-
nance, which places him beyond the reach of 
" David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1962); Riggs, "Thailand"; 
William J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional 
Change and Development (Honolulu; East-West Center 
Press, 1966); Mosel, "Thai Administrative Be-
havior"; Herbert P. Phillips, Thai Peasant Personality: 
The Patterning of Interpersonal Behavior in the Village 
of Bang Chan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1965). 
30 Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties; and Southern 
Tagalog Voting: Political Behavior in a Philippine Re-
gion, A.I.D. Research Paper (January, 1972). 
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the envious and allows him to advance his in-
terests with a minimum of external interfer-
ence.37 
The individual and his family need not, how-
ever, face the competitive world alone. They 
can form alliances with others for the purpose 
of mutual aid. Power and wealth are useful in 
the building of such alliances. The ideal is to 
have many allies which maximizes one's secu-
rity. Alliances are built not only for the dyadic 
exchange of aid but also for the establishment 
of a common front against outsiders which al-
lows a successful combination to appropriate a 
disproportionate share of the available benefits. 
Combinations can vary in size, expanding or 
contracting in accordance with the size of the 
arena and the size of the largest opposing com-
bination. Old allies can quickly become oppo-
nents in a struggle over the allotment of the re-
wards of their earlier collaboration. In such a 
setting a high value is placed upon the redistri-
bution, among followers and allies of any mem-
ber of a combination, of benefits which he may 
obtain. 
Though Philippine society is highly competi-
tive, there exists, nonethless, an awareness of a 
broader community-wide interest and a yearn-
ing for community-wide harmony. While skepti-
cal of the practicality of achieving a general in-
crease in wealth through collective action, and 
dubious about the possibility of achieving exact 
justice through the equalization of benefits, Fi-
lipinos realize that no important individual or 
group will accept permanent exclusion from ac-
cess to benefits, and that peace within the com-
munity requires that none be permanently ex-
cluded. Inclusion is achieved not through 
equalizing policies but through the rotation of 
benefits over time. Letting other people "have 
their chance," like redistributive sharing, is thus 
seen to be essential to social harmony. 
Philippine political culture thus has some 
similarities with those of the earlier political 
systems, but it differs from them as well. 
Though "individualistic" to the point of disor-
der, it is not anarchic to the same degree as 
those of the Kalinga and Tausug. Though 
highly inegalitarian, it lacks the harsh authori-
tarianism of premodern Thailand. Finally, 
while it provides a setting appropriate for a 
heavy reliance on dyadic action, it also offers 
37 For excellent discussions of behavior and its struc-
tural basis in societies not very different from that of 
the Philippines, see Edward C. Banfield's classic The 
Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe: The Free 
Press, 1958); and more recently Jane Schneider, "Of 
Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame and Access to 
Resources in Mediterranean Societies," Ethnology, 10 
(January, 1971), 1-24. 
hope to aspirations for collective action for the 
common good. 
Structurally, the Philippine political system 
viewed from the top downward, appears to be 
composed mainly of discrete entities: There are 
a wide variety of occupationally specialized 
voluntary associations. There are two nation-
wide political parties which biennially run 
slates of candidates for a wide variety of 
elective offices. There is a Congress, both of 
whose houses usually though not invariably or-
ganize themselves at the beginning of each ses-
sion on party lines. There are departments and 
agencies of government staffed largely by those 
who have passed civil service examinations. 
And there is a system of courts. All of these 
political and governmental structures function 
in part at least as do their American counter-
parts. 
But in other ways, which seem puzzling to 
American observers, these structures operate in 
a manner not easily explained by the group the-
ory of politics. Associational and institutional 
interest groups account for only a small part of 
the totality of interest articulation. The two ma-
jor parties are identical in their social composi-
tion and do not present distinctive or even dis-
tinguishable programs to the electorate. Party 
switching is endemic, as are cross-party alli-
ances for control of the government. Two pres-
idents of the Republic, since Independence, 
switched parties shortly before being elected. 
Repeatedly in the House of Representatives dis-
loyal members of one party have helped to 
overthrow their party's speaker by joining with 
the opposite party to install one of the latter's 
members in this powerful post. Twice in recent 
years members of one party helped the opposite 
party retain the speakership with the tacit sup-
port of their own party's chief executive. Mem-
bers of the bureaucracy, on the whole, show 
but limited regard for formally established lines 
of authority, while judges often are suspected 
of deciding cases with less than strict impartial-
ity. 
Some reasons why this system operates quite 
differently from the American one, whose 
macro-structures it seems at first sight to dupli-
cate, begin to appear when one examines the 
Philippine political system not from the top 
downward but from the bottom upward. One 
then discovers that it makes as much use of 
nondiscrete as of discrete structures. For the 
performance of certain tasks it relies heavily, 
though not of course exclusively, upon a great 
net of dyadic alliances, some of them horizontal 
but more of them vertical, leading inward and 
upward from the villages to the national govern-
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ment, from "little people" to "big people," and 
from those who have favors to ask or demands 
to make to those who have the power to grant 
them. This network of alliances often shows lit-
tle regard for the boundaries which separate 
discrete structures, whether they be interest 
groups, parties, or the various instrumentalities 
of government. And in performing its various 
tasks, the Philippine political system proceeds 
as much through particular decisions affecting 
specific individuals, and based on the principles 
of favoritism and the quid pro quo, as through 
categorical decisions applied impersonality and 
impartially in accordance with the law. In 
short, the Philippine political system makes use 
of both discrete and dyadic structures in a mix 
which contains a substantially larger compo-
nent of dyadic structure than does its American 
counterpart. 
The nature of this Philippine mixture can be 
seen in the way the system performs two major 
tasks: the election of public officials and the 
processing of the public's demands for govern-
mental outputs. I shall discuss each of these two 
tasks and the structures which perform them 
separately. 
The most striking feature of elections in the 
Philippines is the strong disposition of the mass 
of ordinary citizens to vote for "personalities" 
rather than political parties. Clear evidence of 
this was found in the course of analyzing the 
contents of a large number of ballots taken 
from ballot boxes in ten sample precincts of a 
typical province after the off-year elections of 
1963. These showed that in the average pre-
cinct, 74 per cent of the ballots were cross-
party ones, i.e., contained votes for candidates 
of more than one party.38 
The cross-party voting habits of the elector-
ate have their counterpart in the campaign 
techniques of candidates for elective offices. 
These find it necessary to build what are essen-
tially personal campaign organizations. In this 
they seek the help of lower level political lead-
ers who have personal followings whose votes 
they can deliver, and of candidates for even 
higher offices who are willing to help finance 
the candidate's campaign in exchange for aid in 
their own search for votes. In both cases, their 
main concern is to find strong allies, without 
much regard for their party identification. Thus 
many such alliances cut across party lines. 
Formally, each party is an association com-
posed of those who have become party mem-
38 For a report on the analysis of these ballots, see 
Carl H. Lande, "Parties and Politics in the Philippines," 
Asian Survey, 8 (September, 1968), pp. 242-247; and 
Southern Tagalog Voting, pp. 81-93. 
bers. In practice each party, at any point in 
time, is a multi-tiered pyramid of personal 
followings, one heaped upon the other. Each 
link in the chain of vertical dyads is based upon 
personal assurances of support and conditional 
upon the downward flow of patronage and 
spoils. But even this description of a party ex-
aggerates its coherence. For as has been noted, 
political leaders wander into and out of parties 
with their personal followers in tow, feeling no 
strong obligation, and being under no real pres-
sure, to support their party mates. Party mem-
bership is not a category but a matter of de-
gree.39 
If one wishes to discover the real framework 
upon which election campaigns are built, one 
must turn away from political parties and focus 
one's attention upon individual candidates and 
the vertical chains of leadership and follower-
ship into which they arrange themselves of any 
given point in time. While tending to tie to-
gether persons who claim the same party label, 
these chains must in fact be viewed as indepen-
dent structures resembling a network of strong 
vines which variously cling to or twist back and 
forth between two great but hollow trees. 
The personal basis of political loyalty helps to 
account for the types of individuals who win 
elections. Victory tends to go to those with the 
greatest personal wealth, to those with the most 
flamboyant campaign styles, and to those who 
are thought most likely to be able to win and 
thus to have access to patronage and other re-
wards of office. A candidate's position on 
questions of ideology or his loyal support of 
such as there is of party policy appears to be of 
minimal importance. 
When one inquires into the way the public's 
demands for governmental outputs are pro-
cessed in the Philippines, one finds that less use 
is made of the "primary" ties of kinship and 
patronship-clientship than was the case in the 
contesting of elections, and more use is made 
of ties arising out of considerations of special-
ized economic interest. But such arrangements 
insofar as they are employed, also are in large 
part dyadic. 
In Almond's reworking of the "group theory" 
of politics into the framework of a political sys-
ra For case studies of local and provincial politics 
which illustrate these points, see Mary R. Hollnsteiner, 
The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality 
(Quezon City: Community Development Research 
Council, University of the Philippines, 1963); Remigio 
E. Agpalo, Pandanggo-Sa-llaw: The Politics of Occi-
dental Mindoro, Papers in International Studies, South-
east Asia Series, No. 9 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University 
Center for International Studies, 1969); and Lande, 
Leaders, Factions, and Parties, pp. 132-140. 
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terns model, the demands of individual citizens, 
in a more developed polity are satisfied 
through a series of consecutive "conversion pro-
cesses," performed by a number of specialized 
structures. Conversion as it goes through its 
several stages involves the progressive transfor-
mation of the particular into the categorical, 
and then into the particular once again. In the 
end, the individual citizen gets what he wants, 
or a portion of it, but only as a result of a 
lengthy process that is designed to assure that 
all who are like himself will receive the same 
benefits or be subjected to the same depriva-
tions. 
Almond's model of this process fits the Phil-
ippines only to a limited degree. Private goals 
may be attained in disregard of the law by 
members of all social strata. The powerful, the 
rich, and the well connected, can obtain favored 
treatment through personal office holding, 
through the use or threat of force, or by offer-
ing material rewards to bureaucratic decision 
makers. The weak and the poor often can hope 
to obtain leniency either by becoming the 
clients of persons in positions of power or, in 
the case of those who lack such connections, 
through appeals for awa (pity)—an appeal 
which carries much weight in Philippine cul-
ture. For those who can obtain governmental 
favors or exemption from law for themselves, 
and this includes most of the politically adept 
members of society, there is little incentive to 
work for the passage of general legislation. 
This helps to account for the relatively small 
part which is played in the interest articulation 
process by organized interest groups. 
The argument should not be overstated. 
There are in the Philippines many voluntary as-
sociations which to some degree resemble 
American pressure groups, and their number is 
growing rapidly.40 With a few exceptions, how-
ever, notably that of the sugar industry, for 
whose political effectiveness there is a special 
historical explanation, these groups are small, 
subject to fission, and fairly short lived. While 
they do press for general legislation, major por-
tions of their leaders' efforts are devoted to in-
terceding with public officials on behalf of 
specific individuals and firms. As a result, many 
such associations are widely thought to be the 
personal instruments of their leaders whose pri-
vate interests receive first attention. Ordinary 
40 See Remigio E. Agpalo, The Political Process and 
the Nationalization of the Retail Trade in the Philip-
pines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 
1962); and Robert B. Stauffer, The Development of an 
Interest Group: The Philippine Medical Association 
(Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1966). 
members of the category for which an associa-
tion professes to speak usually have little to 
gain through membership unless they have per-
sonal ties with the leaders sufficiently close to 
justify the hope that special efforts at interven-
tion will be made in their behalf. Most individ-
uals find it more to their advantage to cultivate 
whatever personal connections they may have 
with any politician who is willing to help them 
obtain favors. 
The nature of Philippine political structure 
also affects the outcome of the interest aggrega-
tion process. Specifically, it prevents the two 
major parties from offering the electorate a 
choice between two reasonably coherent and 
distinctive party programs. The reason for this 
appears to be as follows: According to Al-
mond's schema, which fits most modern de-
mocracies, individual political parties, while 
representing broader slices of society than do 
individual interest groups, still seek support 
mainly from one or another part of the whole 
spectrum of interests. This permits each party 
to devise a program that is at least to some de-
gree distinctive and coherent. In the Philippines, 
however, both major political parties are what 
Maurice Duverger called "cadre parties," led 
by members of the elite who in each province 
and town compete with each other in seeking 
electoral support from members of all social 
strata.41 They are able to win such support 
largely through the massive distribution of a 
broad spectrum of particular rewards appropri-
ate to the private needs of members of all sec-
tors of society. At the same time, leaders in 
both parties compete with each other in trying 
to satisfy to some degree at least the broader 
legislative demands of virtually all articulate in-
terest groups. 
This makes both major parties excellent 
compromises but poor instruments for the for-
mulation of distinctive and consistent pro-
grams. Such programs, insofar as they exist at 
all in the Philippines, are the creations not of 
parties but of individuals. Each new president 
when he takes office begins to create his own 
program. In doing so, he is guided by his per-
sonal views, the views of his advisers, and by a 
variety of pressures from diverse sources which 
no president can ignore. Each member of the 
Congress does roughly the same, though many 
members of both parties respond in some de-
gree to pressure or persuasion from the incum-
bent president. Thus, the legislative output of 
the Philippine government is the resultant of 
41 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organi-
zation and Activity in the Modern State, 2nd ed. (Lon-
don: Methuen, 1959). 
118 The American Political Science Review Vol. 67 
the individual decisions of numerous legisla-
tors, guided to some degree by the president, 
rather than the handiwork of the dominant po-
litical party as such. 
However legislation in any case is a less im-
portant aspect of the governmental process in 
the Philippines than in countries where laws are 
strictly enforced. More important from the 
point of view of most voters and therefore of 
most legislators is the way law is enforced—or 
not enforced—with respect to specific individu-
als, firms, and localities by administrators. 
Members of the Congress influence adminis-
trative decisions by threatening to cut depart-
mental appropriations or block promotions, as 
well as by placing their own proteges in various 
departments and agencies. One finds therefore 
a complex network of personal alliances which 
cut across the formal boundaries between the 
branches of government. This is the case, of 
course, in all political systems to some degree, 
but in the Philippines the pattern is especially 
marked. 
This system of alliances has consequences 
for the informal operation of the executive 
branch. Since the proteges of members of Con-
gress are more dependent for their advance-
ment upon the intervention of their extrade-
partmental patrons than upon the good will of 
their immediate superiors, bureaucratic disci-
pline is uncertain. Saddled with many uncon-
trollable subordinates, the wise official responds 
by attempting to create a personal following of 
his own among those of his subordinates who 
show a willingness to give him their primary 
loyalty in return for the receipt of special fa-
vors, and by refusing to delegate authority to 
any but his personal clients.42 
42 The Tagalog term for such a client is bata (literally, 
"child"). Modern organizations in the Philippines, both 
in the government and the private sector, are honey-
combed with bata systems of the classic patron-client 
type. Equally widespread are compadre relationships of 
the type found in Latin America and medieval Europe. 
These may be either vertical or horizontal. A function-
ally equivalent tie among Filipino Muslims is that which 
results from swearing together on the Koran. Finally, 
in the economic sphere there are to be found suki rela-
tionships between buyers and sellers who deal with each 
other on the basis of favored treatment. The latter type 
of relationships have been described by James N. An-
derson, in "Buy and Sell Economic Personalism: Foun-
dations for Philippine Entrepreneurship," Asian Survey, 
9 (September, 1969), 641-668. The "compadre system," 
which in Latin America is called compadrazgo, has 
been described by numerous writers. The best compara-
tive discussion is that of Sidney W. Mintz and Eric R. 
Wolf, "An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood (Com-
padrazgo)," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 6 
(Winter, 1950), 341-468. For an excellent survey of 
various relationships of this sort see Julian Pitt-Rivers, 
"Pseudo Kinship," in The International Encyclopedia 
To summarize: Together with a multistage 
conversion process, performed by a succession 
of specialized structures, one finds in the Phil-
ippines a much more simple process of favor 
seeking and favor giving between members of 
the public and administrative decision makers. 
This process is carried on through chains of 
dyadic ties that bypass interest groups, parties 
and the law-making structures, and therefore 
lessen the part they play in the country's gover-
nance. 
A number of consequences follow from this 
heavy reliance upon dyadic methods of goal at-
tainment: 
(1) It provides specific benefits for some 
members of all sectors of society, thereby mini-
mizing intercategorical, including interclass, 
hostility, and reducing the bitterness of conflict 
between the political parties as well as between 
other organized groups. At the same time, it 
produces dissatisfaction among those other 
members of all sectors of society who have not 
received their share of specific rewards. 
(2) By permitting favoritism to undermine 
the impersonal administration of justice, it con-
tributes to the near anarchy which presently 
prevails in many parts of the Philippines, and it 
erodes public confidence in the system of gov-
ernment. 
(3) It causes changes in governmental policy 
to be secular rather than cyclical, for it makes 
change depend not upon the alternation in 
power of the two political parties but mainly 
upon long-term changes in the constellation of 
forces in Philippine society, as well as upon the 
accident of an individual president's personal 
views. 
(4) It produces a system whose responsive 
and distributive capabilities are quite high, but 
whose extractive and regulative capabilities are 
exceedingly low. 
(5) It makes the mobilization of political 
support immensely costly both in money and 
effort. An added cost is the growing conviction 
among many Filipino intellectuals that holding 
these highly expensive periodic elections is too 
high a price to pay for the advantages of de-
mocracy. 
(6) Finally, it leads to that preoccupation 
with personalities, offices, and spoils, and that 
lack of interest in policy or ideology, which is 
so strikingly characteristic of Philippine poli-
tics. 
The Four Systems Compared 
Four Southeast Asian political systems, im-
of the Social Sciences, 8 (New York: Crowell, Collier 
and Macmillan, 1968), 408-431. 
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bedded in different political traditions and rep-
resenting different stages of political modern-
ization, have illustrated the tasks which can be 
performed by dyadic structures composed vari-
ously of ties of kinship, friendship, patronship-
clientship and interpersonal political alliances. 
It may be asked why these Southeast Asian 
societies show such a marked tendency to em-
ploy dyadic structures in preference to discrete 
ones. Several possible explanations suggest 
themselves: One is that the peoples of these so-
cieties find models of dyadic structure in their 
cognatic kinship systems, and therefore are in-
clined to favor dyadic devices when they build 
larger structures that embrace nonkinsmen. If 
this is true, then peoples that have unilineal de-
scent systems, which divide society into discrete 
clans and lineages, should favor those nonkin-
ship structures that are discrete. I have dis-
cussed some cases which illustrate such a trans-
fer of structural principles from the kinship to 
the nonkinship sphere elsewhere.43 And there is 
statistical evidence of a strong association be-
tween the presence or absence of these two 
types of kinship and that of some other politi-
cal institutions.44 But the argument must not be 
pressed too far. A growing body of anthropo-
logical research shows that peoples with unili-
neal systems of descent employ various types of 
dyadic structures alongside discrete descent 
groups and voluntary associations. In such soci-
eties, dyads are used especially to build alliances 
across the boundaries which separate descent 
groups so as to free rulers and others from an 
exclusive dependence upon their lineage and 
43 See Lande, "Kinship and Politics in Pre-Modern 
and Non-Western Societies." 
44 Data from George Peter Murdock's "World Eth-
nographic Sample" were employed to test the hypothesis 
that cognatic societies are less likely than unilineal so-
cieties to assign positions of political leadership on a 
hereditary basis. This entailed the construction of a 
two-by-two table for unilineal versus bilateral (cog-
natic) descent and for hereditary versus non-hereditary 
political succession. The number of societies which fit 
into the table were 384. Unilineal societies tended to 
have hereditary political succession approximately four 
times as often as non-hereditary succession, while bi-
lateral (cognatic) societies were almost equally divided 
between the two types of succession. The Phi coefficient 
was .32, indicating a relatively strong relationship in 
the hypothesized direction. The Chi square test indi-
cated that the relationship would occur by chance in 
less than one out of 1,000 cases. Another two-by-two 
table was constructed for unilineal descent versus bi-
lateral (cognatic) descent and for hereditary slavery 
versus the absence of hereditary slavery (slavery if pres-
ent, being only temporary or nonhereditary). This time 
the number of societies in the table was 464. While 27 
per cent of the unilineal societies had hereditary slavery, 
only 12 per cent of those with bilateral (cognatic) de-
scent did so. The Phi coefficient was .18. The Chi square 
clan mates.45 And peoples with cognatic sys-
tems of kinship in Southeast Asia and else-
where, as they become more modern, do of 
course make an increasing use of discrete struc-
tures. 
There are other possible explanations for the 
proliferation of dyadic structures of the type 
described here in these four societies, which are 
not inconsistent with the previous one. The 
shortage of manpower in relationship to availa-
ble land, which prevailed in most of Southeast 
Asia until quite recently, may have encouraged 
the development of a variety of simple but effec-
tive dyadic devices, ranging from compulsory 
clientage through debt bondage to slavery, 
which allow individuals to exploit the labor of 
other individuals for their private advantage. 
(In regions where land is scarce the impetus for 
the creation of patron-client ties probably is 
more likely to come from below, i.e., from ten-
ants who seek to ensure their access to land.) 
The endemic nature of private violence, en-
couraged by a conception of honor which re-
quires that personal affronts and injuries be 
avenged by force, may have also encouraged 
the extension of webs of alliances suitable for 
defense and offense in private warfare. The 
steady growth of private armies under the con-
trol of warlord-politicians, a neo-feudal devel-
opment which has characterized the Philippines 
since independence and is one of the underly-
ing causes of the current crisis in that country, 
illustrates this point. 
Finally, all four societies share a "limited 
good," "constant pie," or "zero sum" view of 
the resources available in a community in the 
sense in which these terms have been applied 
by George Foster in Mexico and lames Scott in 
Malaya.46 Such a view, which perceives anyone 
test again indicated the relationship would occur by 
chance in less than one out of 1,000 cases. The data 
were taken from George Peter Murdock, "World Eth-
nographic Sample," American Anthropologist, 59 (Au-
gust, 1957), 664-687. I shall be glad to supply the tables 
on request. 
45 See J. P. Singh Uberoi, Politics of the Kula Ring: 
An Analysis of the Findings of Bronislaw Malinowski 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962); and 
Franz Michael, The Origins of Manchu Rule in China: 
Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the 
Chinese Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1942), especially pp. 80-98. 
* George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image 
of Limited Good," American Anthropologist, 67 (April, 
1965), 293-315; and James C. Scott, Political Ideology 
in Malaysia: Reality and Beliefs of an Elite (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 91-149. Fos-
ter, p. 296, associates the "image of limited good" with 
land shortage. But like clientage, it seems to be found 
also in peasant societies where land is not in short 
supply. 
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else's gain to be one's own loss, would seem to 
encourage a strategy for self advancement that 
leads the individual to concentrate upon seek-
ing concrete benefits for himself and his family, 
to reward others only on the basis of a quid pro 
quo, and to try to convert others into exploita-
ble dependents. 
It may be asked how it was possible for these 
four systems to operate with so little reliance 
on discrete structures. The answer would seem 
to lie in the fact that the particular needs of 
individuals can be met fairly effectively through 
dyadic interactions, and that discrete structures, 
general laws, and their impersonal enforcement 
are necessary only when categorical or collec-
tive goals are sought. 
Barton's and Kiefer's descriptions of Kalinga 
and Tausug political life suggest that the tradi-
tional political process in these societies con-
sists mainly of tasks that can be performed sep-
arately for various individuals, and in a decen-
tralized fashion, i.e., of the ajudication of pri-
vate disputes. Deliberate legislation does not 
occur in Kalinga where custom is the basis of 
law. In the Tausug state, law codes are formu-
lated by the sultan, without the aid of a council 
or similar body. Administration, Kiefer reports, 
does not exist in the Tausug state as something 
separate from ajudication and the same may 
be said of Kalinga.47 
The tasks of the Thai monarchy were more 
diverse and therefore required more compli-
cated structures. To perform them, the mon-
archy established an elaborate system of admin-
istration. But that system lacked the structural 
stability and functional specificity found in the 
modern state. Tasks appear to have been as-
signed as much to individuals as to localities or 
departments. Governmental departments were 
subject to dissolution when their heads died or 
lost royal favor. Officialdom as a whole thus 
was unable to develop the cohesion and 
strength of a full-fledged Weberian bureau-
cracy. Finally, the Thai monarch, like other tra-
ditional Southeast Asian rulers, and unlike the 
monarchs of Europe, governed without a par-
liament. Legislation was the prerogative of the 
king, who usually ruled in a fairly arbitrary 
fashion. The Thai thus lacked the experience, 
so crucial to the evolution of the modern demo-
cratic rechtsstaat, of observing open debates on 
legislation by representatives of different social 
orders or points of view, taking the form of 
conflicting categorical demands that were re-
solved categorically. All this helps to explain 
why the king and the massive network of 
47 Kiefer, Tausug Armed Conflict, p. 194. 
clients and subclients who staffed his govern-
ment appear more prominent than the corpo-
rate structures of the premodern Thai state. 
There remains the most nearly modern of 
the four Southeast Asian political systems, the 
Republic of the Philippines. Like other postco-
lonial states it has the usual functionally spe-
cialized branches of government patterned 
closely upon the model of its colonial tutor. 
And it has a growing number of formally orga-
nized voluntary associations including political 
parties which attempt to perform what Almond 
calls the articulation and aggregation of inter-
ests. Yet to a considerable degree, the interests 
of individuals in the Philippines are satisfied in-
dividually through direct dyadic arrangements 
of exchange between them and specific office-
holders in the bureaucracy or the judiciary. In-
sofar as this occurs, the conversion of particu-
lar demands into categorical prescriptions be-
comes unnecessary, and the specialized associa-
tional and governmental conversion structures 
are bypassed. 
A Typology of Action Groups 
The main argument of this article has been 
that dyadic structures perform tasks differently 
than do groups of the type described by the 
"group theory" of politics. If the argument is 
valid, then it should be possible to devise a 
set of models to describe these and perhaps 
other structural types and their modes of per-
formance. 
I propose to do this at two different levels of 
what Giovanni Sartori has called the "ladder of 
abstraction."48 I shall begin with a set of three 
very simple types, arrived at deductively, cast 
at a very high level of abstraction, and designed 
to be very broadly applicable. As suggested by 
Sartori the number of attributes of each highly 
abstract type will be kept to a minimum. 
Then, at a lower level of abstraction, which 
permits the filling in of more detail, I shall out-
line, with the help of a set of paired proposi-
tions, two contrasting types which, though 
they are in principle less broadly applicable, do 
fit, I believe, a large number of real institutions 
found in developing and more developed coun-
tries. 
Each of the first three highly abstract types 
consists of three principles which, I suggest, are 
linked in each type. The principles are those 
of composition, action pattern and task. They 
are linked in that they are logically most 
48 Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in 
Comparative Politics," American Political Science Re-
view, 64 (December, 1970), 1040-1046. 
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suited to each other. By "most suited" I mean 
that the inner logic of each of the three is such 
that if one principle is chosen, the acceptance 
also of the other two provides logically the 
most efficient means (though not the only 
means) of goal achievement. 
The three types are named "trait group," 
"web" and "collectivity." Each designates a 
distinctive type of action group. Their features 
are outlined in Table 1. 
I shall not discuss the principles which com-
prise each type here. To elaborate on the 
characteristics of trait groups and webs would 
repeat arguments made elsewhere in this arti-
cle. To discuss collectivities would greatly ex-
pand the article's scope. I have included the last 
type in the table simply in order to suggest how 
another basic type of action group might be de-
scribed in terms of a few interrelated principles. 
The structural elements of each type, that is 
to say composition and action pattern, have 
been listed first for the following reason: Struc-
ture can be a cause as well as a consequence of 
other elements of a system. Ancient institutions 
often display an ability to survive which may 
be hard to explain on functional grounds, and 
by their presence may discourage the growth of 
new institutions and the performance of new 
tasks. A similar conservative bias applies, I 
think, to structural principles. A society accus-
tomed to certain of these is likely to make use 
of them even in those new institutions which it 
creates to replace old ones that have fallen into 
decline. If it is true, as I have argued here, that 
certain principles of composition, action and 
task are linked, then a society's addiction to 
given principles of structure will limit to some 
extent the types of goals it will be able to pursue. 
Conversely, if a society's leaders commit them-
selves to pursuing wholly new types of goals, 
they must create not merely new institutions, 
but institutions based on the structural princi-
ples appropriate to these new types of goals. 
The types suggest an approach to one of 
the problems of structural-functional analysis: 
The disjunction between those strategies for 
analysis that begin with structures and those 
that begin with functions. Perhaps it will be 
possible to move back and forth between struc-
tural and functional analyses more easily at the 
level of their underlying principles. A concern 
with such principles also may help one to con-
nect micro-, macro- and middle-level analysis, a 
point previously made by Rene Lemarchand.49 
It may be useful now to descend the ladder 
of abstraction a rung or two and to examine 
two further types which are sub-types of two 
of the types described in the previous table. 
Because the new types are less general than 
the previous ones, they can be outlined in 
greater detail. The trait group now takes the 
more specific form of a "trait association," with 
some degree of organization and a head. The 
web takes the form of a vertical web or "per-
sonal following." It need not be given a head 
for a web is inconceivable without a central fig-
ure. Both types, furthermore, are described as 
they operate in a setting where group attach-
ment is voluntary and there is at least some 
competition among rival groups. Thus the types 
do not fit either a one-party state or a feudal 
fief. 
In many but not in all of their characteristics 
these two types are polar ones, whose distinc-
48 Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Eth-
nicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in 
Nation Building," American Political Science Review, 
64 (March, 1972), p. 68. 
Table 1. A Partial Typology of Action Groups 




"£_ Action pattern 
Task 
Examples 





Shared ally or leader 
Exchange of aid 
Narrow spectrum cate- Disparate individual goal 
gorical goal attainment attainment 
Interest groups, ideologi- Personal alliance systems, 
cal groups, classes personal followings 
"Collectivity" 
Shared membership in a 
bounded community 
Division of common 
tasks 
Broad spectrum collec-
tive goal attainment 
Families, lineages, corpo-
rations, states 
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tive features can be placed at opposite ends different structural principles, or fall between 
of the same continua. For this reason, I shall the ends of a continuum. Or they may change 
describe the two types together, with the help their position on a continuum over'time. Thus 
of a set of paired propositions. These are the Adrian Mayer shows how the closest allies of 
result of (a) deduction from simple structural the central member of an ego-centered web 
concepts; (b) current theory concerning net- may over time form so tight a core that the 
works and dyads, especially that formulated by central member becomes obscured by what has 
Robert Pehrson, George Foster, John Thibaut become a discrete multimember group.50 Fi-
and Harold Kelley, Norman Whitten and Alvin nally, the peculiar traditions of a specific cul-
Wolfe, and myself; and (c) a growing body of ture may in various ways alter a case which in 
empirical research conducted in certain geo- other ways would fit the type, 
graphic regions where networks have attracted 
particular scholarly attention. _ " A d ™ n t l t
c -™?ya: , J""16, si§nific(
anc<f, of Quasi-
r „ . , ., „ / ^ ^ . Groups in the Study of Complex Societies, in The So-
Whlle the two types are meant to be quite cial Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. Michael 
broadly applicable, few institutions will conform Banton, ASA Monograph No. 4 (New York: Praeger, 
to them exactly. Real institutions may combine 1966), pp. 115-117. 
Table 2. Trait Associations and Personal Followings 
A Set of Paired Propositions 
DEFINITIONS 
A trait association is an organized group of persons A personal following is a vertical dyadic web, 
united by the fact that they believe themselves to bound together by the fact that the followers have 
share a distinguishing trait, or fall into a distin- a common leader, 
guishing category. It has a head. 
CONDITIONS 
The following propositions concerning the structure and performance of 
trait associations and personal followings assume a setting characterized 





Trait associations: Personal followings: 
Tend to grow out of pre-existing trait groups. Tend to be the creations of their leaders. (A would-
(Recognition of the possession of a shared trait be leader by winning the adherence of various in-
tends to precede organization and the selection of dividuals, creates a following. Only then does a 
a head.) sense of community appear.) 
Reason for Appearance 
Tend to appear when there are objects of common Tend to appear when there are opportunities for 
interest which can be attained through collective mutually advantageous exchanges between leaders 
action. and followers. 
Are especially likely to appear when such objects Are especially likely to appear when leaders and 
cannot be attained through individual action. followers can provide large gains to each other 
at small costs to themselves. 
Methods of Maintenance 
Tend to be maintained by emphasizing shared Tend to be maintained by periodic exchanges of 
needs and shared dangers, and by the demonstra- favors between leaders and followers. (Such favors 
tion of gains resulting from past collective action. may be either substantial or symbolic. Thus they 
may be the ends or the means of group cohesion.) 
Size 
Size tends to be closely related to: Size tends to be limited by: 
The number of persons who share the trait. The number of followers with whom the leader 
can maintain face-to-face relationships. 
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The presence of parallel groups with similar 
traits and interests with which fusion can take 
place. 
The presence of rival groups with conflicting 
traits and interests which can serve as stimuli for 
counter-organization. 
The resources for distribution available to the 
leader. 
Tend to be stable and enduring. 
Stability and Endurance 
Tend to be unstable and of short endurance. 
For the group to endure, gains for participants 
need not equal or exceed costs in the short run, 
but must promise to do so in the long run. 
Endurance is threatened by indications that in-
dividual or group goals cannot be attained 
through collective action. 
For the group to endure, gains for participants 
must equal or exceed costs in the short run. 
Personal followings are highly vulnerable to 
fragmentation, shrinkage, disintegration, or dis-
solution if: 
The leader loses his access to distributable re-
sources. 
The leader is challenged by rival leaders with 
greater resources. 
The leader dies without being replaced at once 
by a suitable successor with equal resources. 
Roles of Superordination and Subordination 
Group Headship 
Heads tend to be "officers," entrusted with author-
ity to act by their groups. 
Their official acts tend to be enforced by sanc-
tions imposed by the group. 
Such sanctions tend to be most effective when 
groups are multi-functional or mutually exclu-
sive, or both. 
Heads tend to be "leaders" who act on their own 
initiative. 
Group sanctions to compel obedience to leaders 
tend to be rare. 
Individual compliance with the leaders' com-
mands tends to depend heavily upon the consent 
of each follower. 
Group Membership 
The rank and file tend to regard themselves as 
"members" having rights and obligations towards 
the group. 
The rank and file tend to regard themselves as 
"followers," having claims upon and owing favors 
to their leader. 
Criteria for Headship 
The primary criterion for officership tends to be The primary criterion for leadership tends to be 
that the officer share the traits which distinguish 
the group. 
that the leader have status or resources superior to 
those of his individual followers. 
Responsibility or Responsiveness 
Officers tend to a high degree to be responsible to 
their groups for actions taken in the group's behalf. 
Responsibility tends to be enforced by collective 
action involving the whole group or representa-
tives of the group. 
Responsibility tends to be highest on matters of 
general group policy. 
Officers tend to be relatively unresponsive to the 
private demands of individual members. 
Leaders tend to a high degree to be responsive to 
the private demands of individual members. 
Responsiveness tends to be enforced through 
pressure from individual followers, rather than 
by collective action involving the whole group. 
Leaders tend to have considerable freedom to set 
broad goals and policies, as long as they satisfy 
the immediate private needs of their followers. 
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Prestige 
Within the association, the prestige of the officer Within the following and the larger community, 
and of members tends to a high degree to depend the prestige of the leader tends to a high degree to 
on their services to the association. depend on the size of his following. 
In the larger community, the prestige of the officer Within the following and the larger community, the 
and of members tends to a high degree to depend prestige of an individual follower tends to a high 
upon the prestige of the trait group as a whole. degree to depend on the prestige of the leader, and 
the follower's closeness to him. 
(The distribution of prestige in the community 
resembles the top of a circus tent: The peaks, 
supported by the points where poles are placed, 
denote leaders whose prestige is their own. The 
sloping areas near the peaks represent the deriva-
tive prestige of close followers who are raised 
above the common mass by their leaders. The 
troughs denote the prestige of minor followers 
and the unattached.) 
Goals and Goal Attainment 
Types of Goals 
Tend to focus upon a narrow spectrum of related Tend to focus upon a broad spectrum of particular 
categorical or ideological goals. goals, which need not be related. 
Agreement on Goals 
Tend to require a high degree of agreement con- Tend not to require a high degree of agreement 
cerning specific goals. concerning specific goals. 
Alteration of Goals 
Tend to find it difficult to alter specific goals. Tend to find it easy to alter specific goals. 
Participation in Rewards and Costs 
Rewards tend to be of a kind that benefit all who Rewards tend to be of a kind that can be restricted 
share a trait, whether or not they are members of to members of the following: 
the trait association. 
Hence trait-wide participation in the association, Within the following, shares in the rewards tend 
or trait-wide contribution to its costs, will be to be closely related to the follower's value to 
sought. the leader. 
Equality within the group tends to be highly valued. Favoritism tends to be valued and made explicit. 
Methods of Goal Attainment 
Tend to rely to a high degree upon collective Tend to rely to a high degree upon the manipula-
action by the membership. tive skill of the leader. 
Frontal attacks against opposing groups are a Among favored tactics are the following: Play-
favored tactic. ing other actors off against each other; wooing 
away the allies of others; monopolizing access to 
distributors of resources. 
Communication 
Officers tend to communicate with members in Leaders tend to communicate privately with each 
broadcast fashion. follower. 
Messages tend to be categorical in content. Messages tend to be particular in content. 
A high value tends to be placed on confidential 
information, diverse sources of information, and 
direct access to originators of information. 
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Goals and Rewards of Headship 
To a relatively high degree officers are obliged to To a relatively high degree, leaders are free to 
focus their efforts upon the attainment of group focus their efforts upon the attainment of their pri-
goals. vate goals. 
The rewards received by officers tend to be rela- The rewards received by leaders tend to be rela-
tively modest, and be set by the group. tively large, and to be set by themselves. 
The Interaction of Groups in the Polity 
Similarities and Differences Between Groups 
Rival associations tend to be dissimilar in their Rival followings tend to be similar in their com-
composition and goals. position and goals. 
Inter-association disputes tend to turn on cate- Inter-following disputes tend to turn on "per-
gorical issues. sonalities" and spoils. 
Expansion and Consolidation of Groups 
Associations tend to be expanded through the Followings tend to be expanded through the 
broadening of categories, and the "nesting" of nar- "pyramiding" of leaders. Under this procedure 
rower trait associations within more comprehensive several lesser leaders, each accompanied by those 
ones. who remain his personal followers, become the fol-
lowers of a higher leader. 
This is made possible by broadening the spec-
trum of goals. This is made possible by supplying larger quanti-
ties of the same types of rewards. 
Consolidation through pyramiding tends to be 
limited by the resources available to the highest 
leader. 
Changes in Individual Loyalties 
Relatively few members shift their allegiance from The shifting of individual allegiance from one 
one association to another. leader to another tends to be fairly common. 
Changes in allegiance tend to be affected by the 
ability of rival leaders to provide individual re-
wards to their followers. 
The Stability of Inter-Group Alliances 
Alliances between associations tend to be rela- Alliances between followings tend to be relatively 
tively stable. unstable. 
Two-directional reversals of alliances are very Two-directional reversals of alliances are not un-
uncommon (i.e., AB vs CD may become ABC common, 
vs D or A vs BCD, but not AC vs BD). 
Omnibus Propositions 
The Resolution of Conflict 
Systems composed of trait associations tend to re- Systems composed of personal followings tend to 
solve conflicts by the following means: resolve conflicts by the following means: 
Fostering an awareness among individuals and Avoiding issues that are socially divisive, 
groups that they have in common higher inter-
ests which override their areas of disagreement. Employing bargaining as a method of conflict-
resolution. 
Under certain conditions: By creating stable 
majorities which are able to impose solutions to Making rival groups open in their recruitment, 
conflicts. heterogeneous in composition, syncretic in policy, 
and flexible in their alliances. 
Providing opportunities for individual (as dis-
tinguished from group) social mobility, and 
thereby placating potential advocates of conflict. 
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Organization for Goal Achievement 
Systems composed of trait associations tend to be 
better suited than systems composed of personal 
fallowings for the concentration of collective effort 
towards the achievement of clearly defined collec-
tive goals. Specifically, they are well suited for the 
following tasks: 
Systems composed of personal fallowings tend to 
be better suited than systems composed of trait as-
sociations for the rapid attainment of the particular 
goals of individuals. Specifically, they are well 
suited for the following tasks: 
Focusing attention upon goals which are con-
crete and quickly attainable. 
Fostering mutual aid between dissimilar in-
dividuals in the pursuit of their private goals. 
Creating leaders who are sensitive to the needs 
of individual followers, and able to intercede 
with power holders on their behalf. 
Fusing scattered private goals into collective 
goals, devising long-range programs for their 
attainment, and mobilizing for such programs 
support which is massive, disciplined, and sus-
tained. 
Forcing clear-cut choices between incompatible 
goals. 
Restraining individual and sub-group rivalries 
that jeopardize collective goals. 
Creating officers who are committed to collective 
goals, maintaining group control over them, and 
enforcing compliance with their commands. 
Effects upon National Cohesion 
Nations whose rival political groups are trait associ- Nations whose rival political groups are personal 
ations tend to avoid localistic politics. fallowings tend to have localistic politics. 
Nations whose rival political groups are trait as-
sociations tend to be divided on lines of ideology 
or general policy. 
Nations whose rival political groups are trait as-
sociations tend to achieve community-wide or 
nation-wide unity by broadening categories. 
Nations whose rival political groups are personal 
fallowings tend to be divided by a simple struggle 
for power. 
Nations whose rival political groups are personal 
fallowings tend to achieve community-wide or 
nation-wide unity by replacing particular goals with 
categorical or collective goals. 
The Future of Dyadic Structure 
Dyadic arrangements for the advancement of 
self-interest seem natural to man. They satisfy 
the yearning for security, favored treatment, 
and power. They provide a simple means for 
the advancement of self-interest which require 
a minimum of elaborate organization, trust in a 
minimum number of people, and minimal de-
lay in the achievement of private goals. Dyadic 
arrangements furthermore are extremely flexi-
ble and can be employed in diverse situations 
to mobilize a wide variety of individuals. But 
they have disadvantages as well: Stable dyads 
restrict their members' freedom to engage in 
more profitable exchanges. Vertical dyads can 
be demeaning for the subordinate partners, 
leave them in disadvantageous bargaining posi-
tions, and may deprive them of the advantages 
to be gained from class based organization. All 
concerned in a dyadic system may see as unjust 
the favoritism that usually characterizes dyadic 
interaction. Under certain conditions, the disad-
vantages of dyadic political arrangements may 
seem to outweigh their benefits and lead to 
their abandonment. What are these conditions 
and why do they seem to be most common in 
modern societies? James Scott has explored this 
subject at length in two excellent papers.51 I 
should like to add a few comments. 
The conditions are not necessarily the same 
for the ruler and the ruled. From the point of 
view of the ruler the staffing of government 
with personal clients rather than with those 
who have most skill becomes unnecessary when 
he can count on the loyalty of all his subordi-
nates as a matter of course. This is most likely 
to be the case when officials lack the ability to 
overthrow the ruler or influence the succession. 
Such was the case in the stable constitutional 
monarchies of nineteenth century Europe and 
is the case in modern democracies. It is not the 
case in many developing countries, particularly 
in embattled traditional monarchies where the 
ruler feels threatened by many of his own ser-
51 James C. Scott, "The Weakening of Rural Patron-
Client Ties in Colonial Southeast Asia," and "How 
Traditional Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy," unpub-
lished papers, 1971. 
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vants, or in such "bureaucratic polities" as con-
temporary Thailand, where the outcome of the 
struggle for control of the government is deter-
mined by the maneuvering of bureaucratic 
cliques and not by the results of popular elec-
tions. 
From the point of view of the ruler also, the 
attachment of the common people to his offi-
cials or to a landholding nobility becomes un-
necessary and need not be allowed when the 
ruler finds it possible to control his subjects and 
to extract taxes or services from them by other 
means. His ability to do the latter is likely to 
increase as population grows and labor short-
age is replaced by land shortage. For then sub-
jects are not likely to run away and corvee la-
bor can be replaced by landless laborers and 
soldiers hired with taxes taken from the agri-
cultural sector. 
From the point of view of the common man, 
the protection of a patron ceases to be advanta-
geous when he can expect to be secure in his 
life and property and count on equal treatment 
before the courts without the help of a power-
ful protector. This condition is likely to be 
achieved in a rechtsstaat, a state governed by 
the impersonal rule of law. Lacking this, it is 
likely to be achieved also where the individual 
has available to him membership in a discrete 
group which can offer him such protection. 
Finally, from the point of view of both po-
tential patrons and clients, these roles become 
unattractive when it begins to be in their inter-
est to have freedom to shift their superordi-
nates, subordinates, or trading partners at will. 
This, of course, is the case in a modern market 
economy. Where such an economy prevails, 
one can expect dyadic structures to deteriorate 
in the political sphere as well. 
An apolitical bureaucracy, an easily taxable 
populace, a rechtsstaat, freedom of associational 
activity, and a market economy—these condi-
tions are all characteristic of the modern demo-
cratic state. It is not surprising therefore that a 
political science which has devoted most of its 
attention to the study of modern Western de-
mocracies should have found little reason to in-
terest itself in dyadic structures. As other soci-
eties achieve similar conditions, we may expect 
this to be the case there as well. 
Still, in modern states where some of these 
conditions are absent, dyadic and other "tradi-
tional"structures may continue to be impor-
tant. Thus, in the Soviet Union and China, the 
proscription against the creation of formally or-
ganized teams of would-be competitors for 
those in power, either outside or within the rul-
ing party, has resulted in the emergence instead 
of informal cliques and personal followings 
reminiscent of those found in premodern poli-
ties.52 
And even in modern democracies at certain 
levels of the political system dyadic structures 
flourish. Thus, while the mass of American citi-
zens are accustomed to confining their political 
activity to membership in various voluntary as-
sociations and to the periodic casting of ballots, 
those who aspire to positions of high leadership 
in these associations organize themselves dyadi-
cally. The reason is simple: The benefits de-
rived from general legislation can be shared by 
innumerable people. But high offices are in lim-
ited supply. If one hopes to be a presidential 
advisor, one had best attach oneself to a prom-
ising candidate early in the game. 
To conclude: While traditional patron-client 
relationships appear to be breaking down in 
many peasant societies, other types of dyadic 
structures and techniques will continue to play 
a part in politics as long as political actors seek 
and are able to advance their interests particu-
laristically. The study of the political process is 
deficient insofar as it fails to give attention to 
such structures. 
52 Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for 
Chinese Politics," The China Quarterly, 53 (January/ 
March, 1973). 
